Worker mobility in a search model with adverse selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Kaas, Leo
• 署名单位: University of Essex; University of Konstanz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 340-386
• 关键词: Adverse selection; On-the-job search; worker mobility; wage dynamics

摘要

We analyze the effects of adverse selection on worker turnover and wage dynamics in a frictional labor market. We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer promotion wage contracts to workers of different abilities, which is unknown to firms at the hiring stage. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts, promoting high-ability workers only. Low-ability workers have higher turnover rates and are more often employed in low-wage firms. The model replicates the negative relationship between job-to-job transitions and wages observed in the U.S. labor market. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.