Intertemporal coordination with delay options
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Araujo, Luis; Guimaraes, Bernardo
署名单位:
Getulio Vargas Foundation; Michigan State University
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN:
0022-0531
DOI:
10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.008
发表日期:
2015
页码:
793-810
关键词:
Intertemporal
COORDINATION
Delay options
overlapping generations
摘要:
This paper studies equilibrium selection in intertemporal coordination problems with delay options. The risk-dominant action of the underlying one-shot game is selected when frictions are arbitrarily small. Larger frictions introduce real option effects in the model and inhibit coordination. (c) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.