Monetary mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gu, Chao; Wright, Randall
• 署名单位: University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.011
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 644-657
• 关键词: money; mechanisms; bargaining; liquidity; credit

摘要

We provide a series of results for a standard model where exchange is facilitated by liquid assets. Compared to past work, minimal structure is imposed on the mechanism determining the terms of trade. Four simple axioms lead to a class of mechanisms encompassing common bargaining theories, competitive price taking and other solution concepts. Using only the axioms, we establish existence and (perhaps more surprisingly) uniqueness of stationary monetary equilibrium. We also show how to support desirable outcomes using creatively designed mechanisms. Special cases include pure currency economies, but we also consider extensions to incorporate real assets and credit. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.