Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ahn, David S.; Oliveros, Santiago
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 304-310
• 关键词: Approval voting; Scoring rule; Plurality rule; information aggregation

摘要

We compare approval voting with other scoring rules for environments with common values and private information. For finite electorates, the best equilibrium under approval voting is superior to plurality rule or negative voting. For large electorates, if any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that efficiently aggregates information, then approval voting must do so as well. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.