Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iaryczower, Matias; Oliveros, Santiago
• 署名单位: Princeton University; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.011
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 209-236
• 关键词: Intermediaries; middlemen; bargaining; legislatures; vote buying

摘要

We study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers. We establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon. We show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes, and can be inefficient. To fulfill this role, the middleman's policy preferences and bargaining position must be such that its role of intermediary is credible. But the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy change. The results highlight fundamental differences between the role of intermediaries in politics and exchange economies. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.