Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Copic, Jernej; Ponsati, Clara
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; California Institute of Technology; University of St Andrews
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 276-287
• 关键词: bilateral trade; incomplete information; mechanism design; Robustness; EFFICIENCY

摘要

A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.