Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Bo; Fujishige, Satoru; Yang, Zaifu
• 署名单位: Southern Methodist University; Zhejiang University; Kyoto University; University of York - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 25-36
• 关键词: Decentralized market; Job matching; Random path; Competitive salary; STABILITY

摘要

We analyze a decentralized process in a basic labor market where finitely many heterogeneous firms and workers meet directly and randomly in pursuit of higher payoffs over time and agents may behave myopically. We find a general random decentralized market process that almost surely converges in finite time to a competitive equilibrium of the market. A key proposition en route to this result exhibits a finite sequence of successive bilateral trades from an arbitrary initial market state to a stable matching between firms and workers with a scheme of competitive salary offers. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.