Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hu, Tai-Wei; Wallace, Neil
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.005
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 103-144
• 关键词: mechanism-design; Information-aggregation; Market-game; EFFICIENCY

摘要

A three-stage market-game mechanism is devised that is simple (actions are quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not depend on details of the economy) and achieves efficiency in a two-divisible-good, pure-exchange setting with potential information-aggregation. After an entry stage, agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small, randomly selected group. Then, those offers are announced, and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs determined by a Shapley-Shubik market game. For a finite and large number of players, there exists an almost ex post efficient equilibrium. Conditions for uniqueness are also provided. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.