QWERTY is efficient

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guimaraes, Bernardo; Pereira, Ana Elisa
• 署名单位: Getulio Vargas Foundation
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 819-825
• 关键词: coordination; networks; Timing frictions; dynamic games

摘要

We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.