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作者：Matsumura, T
作者单位：Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm. We find that neither full privatization (the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the shares) is optimal un...
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作者：Marhuenda, F; Ortuno-Ortin, I
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We show, however, that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo. It ...
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作者：Dahlby, B
作者单位：University of Alberta
摘要：This paper describes the calculation of the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF) for a progressive tax system which distorts individuals' labour supply decisions. A formula for the SMCF indicates that the income and substitution effects of the labour supply response are weighted by the changes in individuals' average and marginal tax rates, respectively. Other well-known formulas for the SMCF are shown to be special cases of this formula, The difference between this formula and the Mays...
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作者：Fershtman, C; Weiss, Y
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper examines the role of social rewards as a corrective mechanism for activities which generate externalities. The focus of this paper is on the circumstances under which social rewards provide effective and feasible incentive mechanism that may replace laws and regulations. In particular, social mechanism is effective only in a society in which individuals who care about their standing in the society can survive in the long run. We show that the nature of economic interaction between m...
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作者：Ireland, NJ
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：It is well-known that status-seeking produces distortions in consumption. Competition to achieve status leads to over-consumption of those goods which confer status. It has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to Pareto improvements. In this paper we extend a model of status, which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach, to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax. We show that a Pareto-improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax/benefit sch...
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作者：Weichenrieder, AJ
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Munich
摘要：The paper considers investment incentives in corporate tax systems which grant an imputation credit to shareholders when dividends are distributed from domestic sources. An increase in the dividend tax rate which is induced by lowering the shareholders' imputation rate is shown to potentially depress domestic investment. This result is common to 'old view' models which assume that new equity is the marginal source of firms' finance. In this paper, however, the result is derived in a tax capita...
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作者：Rosenthal, EC
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
摘要：We introduce the following multi-activity public goods problem with excludables. A group of agents with limited budgets is to select a subset of new technologies to be developed. Each technology has a known cost and may provide different returns, which are private information, to the agents. Agents coordinate their activities through a central administrator. Once purchased, technologies are used freely by all contributors. Through examining information provided to the agents and the administra...
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作者：Heyes, AG; Liston-Heyes, C
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：Existing analyses of the implications of price-cap regulation for the development of cost-reducing technologies assume that all R&D is done by the regulated industry. This is unrealistic. We present a simple model of non-cooperative R&D by a regulated firm and a single 'external' developer under a price-cap regime of the sort characterised by Cabral and Riordan. In equilibrium the external developer exerts less R&D than is socially optimal, the regulated firm may exert more or less. A 'tighten...
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作者：Roemer, JE
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We consider a political economy with two partisan parties; each party represents a given constituency of voters. If one party (Labour) represents poor voters and the other (Christian Democrats) rich voters, if a redistributive tax policy is the only issue, and if there are no incentive considerations, then in equilibrium the party representing the poor will propose a tax rate of unity. If, however, there are two issues - tax policy and religion, for instance then this is not generally the case...
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作者：Clark, AE; Oswald, AJ
作者单位：University of Warwick; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Orleans; Universite de Orleans
摘要：This paper describes a theory of rational emulation and deviance. It assumes that individuals care about relative position (or 'status'), and constructs a model of decisionmaking in social and economic settings. The analysis shows why individuals who want to be different from others will, paradoxically, find it rational to imitate other people. The paper also provides a choice-theoretic foundation for a number of ideas in the social psychology and economics literatures. The central point of th...
