Partial privatization in mixed duopoly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matsumura, T
• 署名单位: Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00051-6
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 473-483
• 关键词: quantity-setting duopoly; partial privatization; mixed oligopoly

摘要

We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm. We find that neither full privatization (the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the shares) is optimal under moderate conditions. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.