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作者：Fershtman, C; Gandal, N; Markovich, S
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Tel Aviv University; Tilburg University; University of Chicago
摘要：The incidence of taxation has been extensively discussed in the public finance literature but mainly within a competitive market setting or within a homogenous good (Cournot type) oligopoly. In a differentiated product oligopoly, the effect of taxation can be more complex as the rate of taxation may affect not only the prices, but also the profile and quality of products that are sold in the market. In this paper, we examine the effects of changing tax regimes in a differentiated product oligo...
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作者：Evans, WN; Ringel, JS
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University
摘要：This study examines whether higher state cigarette taxes can be used to improve birth outcomes. Data on the outcomes of interest are taken from the 1989-1992 Natality Detail files, generating a sample of roughly 10.5 million births. The results suggest that smoking participation among pregnant women declines and average birth weights rise when excise taxes are increased. These results can be used to form an instrumental variables estimate of the impact of smoking on birth weight. This estimate...
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作者：DelRossi, AF; Inman, RP
作者单位：University of Wyoming; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The provision of public services through national legislatures gives legislators the chance to fund locally beneficial public projects using a shared national tax base. Nationally financed and provided local (congestible) public goods will be purchased at a subsidized price below marginal cost and may be inefficiently too large as a consequence. An important assumption behind this inefficiency is that national legislators in fact demand more of the locally beneficial project as the local price...
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作者：Parker, SC
作者单位：Durham University
摘要：This paper models optimal linear taxation when occupational choice and labour supply are endogenous. Workers choose between paid employment, self-employment, and unemployment. Self-employment incomes are risky and employees may be involuntarily laid off. Calibrating the model to the UK economy, the optimal tax solution involves relatively high taxation with substantial redistribution, and a higher nominal (but not effective) marginal tax rate imposed on the self-employed than on employees. The...
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作者：Huber, B
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：The paper uses the self-selection approach of Stiglitz (1982) to study tax competition and tax coordination in a many country-optimum income tax model. In the model, the government can impose a non-linear tax schedule on wage income and a (source-based) tax on mobile capital. In an uncoordinated equilibrium, it turns out that countries can use the capital tax instrument to weaken the self-selection constraint. The paper presents examples where positive and negative capital taxes are optimal fr...
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作者：Small, KA
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：When a firm or public enterprise prices output at marginal cost, its profits are related to the degree of local scale economies in its cost function. I show that contrary to common belief, this result holds even when scale economies are affected by a rising factor supply curve. Thus marginal-cost pricing may be profitable even with constant returns to scale. Examples are provided for a monopsonist both with and without price discrimination, and for a case such as highways where congestion-pron...
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作者：Lansing, KJ
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco
摘要：This paper provides a counterexample to the simplest version of the redistribution models considered by Judd (1985) in which the government chooses an optimal distortionary tax on capitalists to finance a lump-sum payment to workers. I show that the steady-state optimal tax on capital income is generally non-zero when the capitalists' utility is logarithmic and the government faces a balanced-budget constraint. With log utility, agents' optimal decisions depend solely on the current rate of re...
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作者：Livernois, J; McKennna, CJ
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：Evidence suggests that a surprisingly large fraction of firms comply with pollution emission standards even though expected penalties for noncompliance are low. We offer an explanation of this puzzle by extending the standard model of enforcement to include a self-reporting requirement and enforcement power. These extensions are enough to challenge the conventional result that higher fines lead to higher compliance rates. We find that under plausible conditions, higher compliance rates are ach...
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作者：Hindriks, J
作者单位：University of Exeter
摘要：In a context where both the poor and the rich are (imperfectly) mobile, this paper compares the Nash equilibrium levels of income redistribution from the rich to the poor when jurisdictions compete either in taxes, in transfers or both in taxes and transfers. Although taxes and transfers are linked through the budget-balanced requirement, the analysis reveals intriguing differences. Indeed, it turns out that transfer competition results in much less redistribution than tax competition, while t...
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作者：Kubik, JD
作者单位：Syracuse University
摘要：This paper examines how Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefit availability and generosity affect the probability that families identify health problems in their children and move onto the SSI rolls. First, I observe that a liberalization of SSI eligibility in 1990 was followed by a substantial re-evaluation of the health status of low-income children by their parents. Then, I find that increases in SSI benefits raise the likelihood that a family identifies a chronic impairment in their ch...
