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作者：Slemrod, J; Greimel, T
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper investigates the relationship of the daily spread between taxable and municipal securities to a daily indicator of the likelihood of a tax reform that would eliminate the preference now accorded to municipal securities, the 'flat tax.' The probability of tax reform is proxied by the market price of the shares of Steve Forbes, a champion of the flat tax, in the Iowa Electronic Market. We find evidence that the indicator of tax reform's prospects was correlated with a decline in the s...
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作者：Hassler, J; Mora, JVR
作者单位：Stockholm University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Unemployment benefits are higher and turnover between unemployment and employment is lower in Europe than in the U.S. We model the political determination of the unemployment insurance to explain these differences. We show that saving and borrowing is a good substitute for unemployment insurance when turnover is high. With high turnover, the median voter thus prefers low unemployment insurance. With low turnover, generous unemployment insurance becomes more valuable. If the median voter cannot...
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作者：Duncan, B
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Denver
摘要：Public goods theory predicts that government spending an charity can perfectly crowd-out charitable contributions. Empirical research has found little support for the perfect crowd-out hypothesis. However, the empirical work only measures part of a contributor's total contribution: gifts of money. Contributors also volunteer labor. This article extends the public goods model to the case in which individuals contribute both time and money to a charity that in turn produces a public good. The mo...
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作者：Raymond, M
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：Hanington (Harrington, W., 1988. Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of Public Economics 37, 29-53) offers an explanation for how relatively high compliance rates might co-exist with low expected fines. His results are highly dependent on the assumptions that all firms are identical and their compliance costs are known. This paper shows that Hanington's results are not necessarily robust in a more general model where asymmetric information and uncertainty are present. (...
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作者：Stennek, J
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：The expected consumer's surplus (ECS) is often used as a monetary measure of consumer welfare. Examples include the theory of regulation, competition policy, and price stabilization. This paper shows that, in general, the ECS does not convey any information about the consumer's ranking of price distributions, if these differ in risk. Moreover, the ECS provides rigorous monetary assessments of consumer welfare if, and only if, the consumer is risk-neutral, and has zero income-elasticity of dema...
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作者：Boadway, R; Marceau, N; Sato, M
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：Transfers to the needy are administered by social workers whose job it is to tag welfare applicants to determine eligibility for disability benefits. The accuracy of tagging depends on the effort of the social workers, which is private information. To prevent shirking and induce optimal effort, costly monitoring is required. Using the framework of optimal non-linear taxation, we characterize the form of the optimal tax-transfer system when the government operates a costly welfare system financ...
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作者：Lahiri, S
作者单位：Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad
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作者：Snyder, SK
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：This paper is a theoretical examination of the testable restrictions of Pareto optimality in an economy with public goods. In contrast to other methods for deriving tests for the optimality of public good provision, ad hoc assumptions about individual public good demand are not required. The testable restrictions derived in this paper are defined over a finite series of aggregate-level data, production data, and individual after-tax income. Despite the relatively sparse data requirements and t...
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作者：Blomquist, S; Christiansen, V
作者单位：Uppsala University; University of Oslo
摘要：This paper integrates two different approaches to the analysis of public provision of private goods (education, health care, day care, etc.). While normative public economics has established an efficiency case for such provision, the commonly held political economy view has been that it is an economically inefficient phenomenon generated by the political process. We establish a political economy framework which in general yields an efficient choice of distributional policy. It follows that the...
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作者：Gradstein, M
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：Assuming a world with excessive taxes, the focuses of this paper are political mechanisms that ensure efficiency enhancing restraints on taxes. In particular, it is shown that supermajority requirements to approve tax increases, as currently used in some US states, is the means of attaining this objective. Their relationship to another such mechanism prevalent in earlier centuries, that of franchise restrictions, is discussed. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
