Truth or consequences - Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Livernois, J; McKennna, CJ
• 署名单位: University of Guelph
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00082-6
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 415-440
• 关键词: pollution control; environmental regulation; Compliance; self-reporting

摘要

Evidence suggests that a surprisingly large fraction of firms comply with pollution emission standards even though expected penalties for noncompliance are low. We offer an explanation of this puzzle by extending the standard model of enforcement to include a self-reporting requirement and enforcement power. These extensions are enough to challenge the conventional result that higher fines lead to higher compliance rates. We find that under plausible conditions, higher compliance rates are achieved with lower fines for noncompliance and the cost of enforcing a given level of aggregate pollution is minimized by setting the fine for noncompliance equal to zero. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D62; D82; L51.