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作者：Berkowitz, D; Li, W
作者单位：Duke University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper develops the concept of tax rights to analyze the impact of fiscal institutions on economic development in transition economies. A government's tax rights are poorly defined when it and other governments and agencies can unilaterally levy taxes on the same tax base. Existing evidence suggests that Chinese local governments have gained more clearly defined tax rights than their Russian counterparts. Using the 'big push' model of industrialization [Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R....
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作者：Casamatta, G; Cremer, H; Pestieau, P
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; University of Liege; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：This paper examines how the issue of political support affects the design of social insurance. It distinguishes between redistributive character and size of social protection. Three main results emerge. First, it may be appropriate to adopt a system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure political support for an adequate level of coverage in the second (voting) stage. Second, supplementary private insurance may increase the welfare of the poor, even if it is ef...
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作者：Francois, P
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Queens University - Canada; University of Melbourne
摘要：A public service motivation (PSM) inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service. Though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration, this motivation has not been formally considered by economists. When a PSM exists, this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain PSM motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm. The model also provides an efficie...
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作者：Morduch, J; Sicular, T
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); Princeton University
摘要：Economic reform is often constrained because rank-and-file bureaucrats responsible for implementation have vested interests that oppose change. Drawing on an unusual longitudinal survey data set for a representative rural county in northern China, we show an alternative, positive scenario consistent with the presence of an implicit, performance-based incentive contract that ties the household incomes of local officials to market liberalization, increases in consumer demand, and the provision o...
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作者：Besley, T
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作者：Bennett, J; Maw, J
作者单位：Brunel University; Swansea University
摘要：A model is developed in which an industry of N greater than or equal to 1 firms is privatised. The 'participation' method of privatisation is used, whereby firms are sold for cash, but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership. In each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment, before output is produced. This investment is unobservable by the state, and therefore non-contractible, There is Cournot competition in the product market. The welf...
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作者：Wu, YR; Zhang, JX
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Existing studies on the effects of fiscal policy under imperfect competition typically treat each firm's price-cost markup as fixed. This paper examines the implications of endogenising the markup in a simple model of income taxation under monopolistic competition. It is demonstrated that an increase in income tax reduces the number of firms, lessens competition among surviving firms and raises the optimal markups in the new steady state. Through this channel, the effects of income taxation on...
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作者：Dixit, A; Olson, M
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：The Cease Theorem states that costless enforcement of voluntary agreements yields efficient outcomes. We argue that previous treatments fail to recognize the full meaning of 'voluntary'. It requires a two-stage game: a non-cooperative participation decision, followed by Coaseian bargaining only among those who choose to participate. We illustrate this in a simple public-goods model, and find outcomes ranging from extremely inefficient to fully efficient. However, the efficient equilibrium is n...
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作者：Rajan, RG; Zingales, L
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：When parties are very unequally endowed, agreement may be very difficult to reach, even if the specific transaction is easy to contract on, and fungible resources can be transferred to compensate the losing party. The very fungibility of the resource transferred makes it hard to restrict its use, changing the amount the parties involved spend in trying to grab future rents. This spill-over effect can inhibit otherwise valuable transactions, as well as enable otherwise inefficient transactions....
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作者：[Anonymous]
