'Public service motivation' as an argument for government provision

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Francois, P
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Queens University - Canada; University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00075-X
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 275-299
• 关键词: Privatization; bureaucracy; Public service motivation

摘要

A public service motivation (PSM) inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service. Though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration, this motivation has not been formally considered by economists. When a PSM exists, this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain PSM motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm. The model also provides an efficiency rationale for low-powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.