Political sustainability and the design of social insurance

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Casamatta, G; Cremer, H; Pestieau, P
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; University of Liege; Universite de Toulouse
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00070-5
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 341-364
• 关键词: social insurance; political support

摘要

This paper examines how the issue of political support affects the design of social insurance. It distinguishes between redistributive character and size of social protection. Three main results emerge. First, it may be appropriate to adopt a system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure political support for an adequate level of coverage in the second (voting) stage. Second, supplementary private insurance may increase the welfare of the poor, even if it is effectively bought only by the rich. Third, the case for prohibiting (supplementary) private insurance may become stronger when the efficiency of private insurance markets increases. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: H23: D72; H50.