Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berkowitz, D; Li, W
• 署名单位: Duke University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00091-2
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 369-397
• 关键词: tax rights; economic transition; Economic development; CHINA; RUSSIA

摘要

This paper develops the concept of tax rights to analyze the impact of fiscal institutions on economic development in transition economies. A government's tax rights are poorly defined when it and other governments and agencies can unilaterally levy taxes on the same tax base. Existing evidence suggests that Chinese local governments have gained more clearly defined tax rights than their Russian counterparts. Using the 'big push' model of industrialization [Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1989. Industrialization and the big push. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1003-1026] within a common-property resource framework, we show that this difference in tax rights helps explain why China has been significantly more successful than Russia. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.