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作者：Brett, C; Keen, M
作者单位：University of Essex; International Monetary Fund
摘要：Far from being used to secure a 'double dividend' by reducing distorting taxes, revenues from environmental taxes seem quite often to be earmarked to particular spending programs. In the US, for example, a range of such taxes feed into environmental trust funds. Such earmarking runs counter to standard notions of good practice in taxing and spending. This paper develops and explores an explanation of such apparent inefficiencies in terms of political uncertainty: roughly, a green incumbent may...
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作者：Hoy, M; Polborn, M
作者单位：University of Guelph; University of Munich
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection. Individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, however, the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium. We describe the conditions under which, from an ex ante standpoint, all individuals gain, all lose or in which some gain and some lose from the exi...
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作者：Bennedsen, M
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School
摘要：Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities fur interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders' lobby activities distort resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labour allocation is improv...
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作者：Goodspeed, TJ
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Hunter College (CUNY)
摘要：Does national taxation of a base influence the degree to which the local government will use the same tax base? Does the tax rate chosen by one local government influence the choices made by another local government? The theoretical answer to these questions is often in the affirmative because of vertical and horizontal externalities that result when several governments are operating at the same time in a fiscal system. However, little empirical information is available. This paper estimates t...
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作者：Scharf, KA
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：This paper asks whether there can be unanimous support for a fiscal constitution that includes tax expenditures for giving among the set of available fiscal instruments. We describe a political economy model of fiscal choices where individuals with different incomes vote over levels of proportional income taxation and over tax incentives for giving, and investigate how the availability of such incentives affects political equilibrium outcomes and welfare for different income groups. We find th...
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作者：Johnson, S; Kaufmann, D; McMillan, J; Woodruff, C
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); The World Bank; Stanford University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden 'unofficial' activity to be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. A comparison of cross-country averages shows that managers in Russia and Ukraine face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith in the court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern European countries find that bureaucratic corruption is s...
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作者：de Meza, D; Webb, D
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Exeter
摘要：By combining hidden types and hidden action, this paper shows that the existence of credit rationing need not imply that lending exceeds the full-information level. In this plausible class of models, the appropriate policy is not to subsidise or tax lending but to make alternatives to entrepreneurship more attractive. Doing so may actually increase the number of those borrowing to set up their own business and yield a strict Pareto improvement. The results extend to equilibria characterised by...
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作者：Bös, D
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Compared with the traditional public-finance approach of a monolithic fully informed planner, earmarking of taxation is less likely to be optimal if a principal-agent setting is considered. where taxing and spending by performed by two separate agents which are monitored by the parliament. We assume that the parliament either maximizes welfare or expected votes. Vote maximizers are more inclined to choose earmarking, but at the price of inefficiently high costs. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. ...
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作者：Hines, JR Jr
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Benefit taxation is a system in which individuals are taxed according to the benefits they receive from public expenditures. This paper describes an alternative to the Standard Lindahl method of determining the distribution of individual benefits from government-provided public goods, and uses this alternative to calculate benefit taxes. This alternative avoids some of the paradoxial features of Lindahl pricing, and generates outcomes in which all consumers benefit from reduced costs of provid...
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作者：Kind, HJ; Knarvik, KHM; Schjelderup, G
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：This paper uses a new economic geography model to analyze tax competition between two countries trying to attract internationally mobile capital. Each government may levy a source tax on capital and a lump sum tax on fixed labor. If industry is concentrated in one of the countries, the analysis finds that the host country will gain from setting its source tax on capital above that of the other country. In particular, the host may increase its welfare per capita by setting a positive source tax...
