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作者：Glaeser, EL; Shleifer, A
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. We derive conditions under which completely self-interested entrepreneurs opt for not-for-profit status, despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises. We also show that even in the absence of tax advantages,...
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作者：Lee, K
作者单位：University System of Maryland; Towson University
摘要：This paper examines the effect of an increase in the tax rates on tax evasion in a model where taxpayers self-insure against possible penalties. The analysis shows that the effect depends on the marginal productivity of self-insurance. If the marginal productivity is not too small, an increase in the tax rates leads to greater tax evasion and less tax compliance. This result stands in contrast with the theoretical result in the literature but accords well with empirical findings. (C) 2001 Else...
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作者：Cremer, H; Pestieau, P
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse; Institut Universitaire de France; University of Liege
摘要：This paper studies the design of the tax and regulatory regime applied to bequests. Bequests are observable, while parent's wealth and children's earning abilities are not. Parents know their children's earning abilities. Parents are altruistic; their utility depends on their children's utilities, but weights may differ between children. The optimal tax schedule strikes a balance between the (often) conflicting 'incentive' and 'corrective' effects. When parents attach identical weights to thei...
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作者：Itaya, J; Shimomura, K
作者单位：Hokkaido University; Kobe University
摘要：The purpose of this paper is to provide a reasonable microfoundation to justify the concept of a conjectural variations equilibrium which is often used in the literature on private provision of public goods with the help of the differential game. By interpreting the steady state conjectures in a dynamic contribution game as the conjectural variations in the corresponding static game, we derive explicit forms of Nash or non-zero conjectural variations, depending on the choice of the strategy sp...
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作者：Hess, GD; Orphanides, A
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Oberlin College; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：This paper investigates the relationship between the business cycle, the election cycle, and the timing and magnitude of foreign conflict. We propose a theoretical model which suggests that in the presence of a reelection motive, the frequency of war will be greater following recessions than otherwise. However, if partially benevolent leaders can influence the size of conflicts, then the consequences may be limited to conflicts of relatively small magnitude. We test the predictions of the theo...
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作者：Kramarz, F; Philippon, T
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In this article, we study the impact of changes of total labor costs on employment of low-wage workers in France in a period, 1990 to 1998, that saw sudden and large changes in these costs. We use longitudinal data from the French Labor Force survey (much less than enquete emploi much greater than) in order to understand the consequences of real decreases and real increases of the labor cost. We examine the transition probabilities from employment to non-employment and from non-employment to e...
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作者：Polinsky, AM; Shavell, S
作者单位：Stanford University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze corruption in law enforcement: the payment of bribes to enforcement agents, threats to frame innocent individuals in order to extort money from them, and the actual framing of innocent individuals. Bribery, extortion, and framing reduce deterrence and are thus worth discouraging. Optimal penalties for bribery and framing are maximal, but, surprisingly, extortion should not be sanctioned. The state may also combat corruption by paying rewards to enforcement agents for reporting viola...
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作者：Ihori, T
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper investigates the effect of wealth taxation on economic growth using an endogenous growth model with the altruistic bequest motive. We introduce intragenerational productivity differentials of human capital formation, resulting in differences of growth rates among individuals. The economy is divided into two groups; those who leave bequests to physical capital investment and those who leave bequests to human capital investment. An increase in taxes on life cycle savings will reduce t...
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作者：Guttman, JM
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：This paper presents a model of the emergence of cooperative social norms in a society composed exclusively of rational agents. Following Kreps et al. [Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., Wilson, R., 1982. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245-252], opportunistic agents are assumed to uphold cooperative norms in order to maintain reputations for being trustworthy - reputations which are necessary in order to find partners in mutu...
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作者：Jousten, A
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：In this paper we introduce a linear bequest motive into a standard life-cycle model, both allowing for credit and annuity market imperfections. First, we characterize the consumption and wealth processes. We find that consumption is non-increasing in the linear bequest parameter for the simplest certainty case, but that the same is not true for life-span uncertainty. Second, we study the issue of annuity valuation. For a sufficiently strong bequest motive, the true value of an annuity is equal...
