A dynamic conjectural variations model in the private provision of public goods: a differential game approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Itaya, J; Shimomura, K
• 署名单位: Hokkaido University; Kobe University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00111-0
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 153-172
• 关键词: private provision; public good; differential game; conjectural variation; matching behavior

摘要

The purpose of this paper is to provide a reasonable microfoundation to justify the concept of a conjectural variations equilibrium which is often used in the literature on private provision of public goods with the help of the differential game. By interpreting the steady state conjectures in a dynamic contribution game as the conjectural variations in the corresponding static game, we derive explicit forms of Nash or non-zero conjectural variations, depending on the choice of the strategy spaces. Furthermore, we find that there may be uncountable many conjectural variations and the possibility of matching behavior (i.e. positive conjectural variations), when non-linear Markov perfect strategies are used and when the domain of a state variable is appropriately restricted. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.