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作者:Glaeser, EL; Shleifer, A
作者单位:Harvard University
摘要:Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. We derive conditions under which completely self-interested entrepreneurs opt for not-for-profit status, despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises. We also show that even in the absence of tax advantages,...
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作者:Lee, K
作者单位:University System of Maryland; Towson University
摘要:This paper examines the effect of an increase in the tax rates on tax evasion in a model where taxpayers self-insure against possible penalties. The analysis shows that the effect depends on the marginal productivity of self-insurance. If the marginal productivity is not too small, an increase in the tax rates leads to greater tax evasion and less tax compliance. This result stands in contrast with the theoretical result in the literature but accords well with empirical findings. (C) 2001 Else...
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作者:Brandts, J; Schram, A
作者单位:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
摘要:We introduce a new design for experiments with the voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods. Subjects report a complete contribution function in each period, i.e. a contribution level for various marginal rates of transformation between a public and a private good. The results show that subjects' behavior cannot be explained exclusively as the result of errors. Individuals exhibit essentially one of two types of behavior. One group of subjects behaves in a way consistent with some ki...
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作者:Cremer, H; Pestieau, P
作者单位:Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse; Institut Universitaire de France; University of Liege
摘要:This paper studies the design of the tax and regulatory regime applied to bequests. Bequests are observable, while parent's wealth and children's earning abilities are not. Parents know their children's earning abilities. Parents are altruistic; their utility depends on their children's utilities, but weights may differ between children. The optimal tax schedule strikes a balance between the (often) conflicting 'incentive' and 'corrective' effects. When parents attach identical weights to thei...
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作者:Glewwe, P; Jacoby, HG; King, EM
作者单位:The World Bank; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要:Many policymakers propose early childhood nutrition programs as a way to increase students' academic achievement. This paper investigates the nutrition-learning nexus using a unique longitudinal data set that follows a large sample of Filipino children from birth until the end of their primary education. We find that better nourished children perform significantly better in school, partly because they enter school earlier and thus have more time to learn but mostly because of greater learning ...
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作者:Slemrod, J; Blumenthal, M; Christian, C
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of St Thomas Minnesota; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要:In 1995 a group of 1724 randomly selected Minnesota taxpayers was informed by letter that the returns they were about to file would be 'closely examined'. Compared to a control group that did not receive this letter, low and middle-income taxpayers in the treatment group on average increased tax payments compared to the previous year, which we interpret as indicating the presence of noncompliance. The effect was much stronger for those with more opportunity to evade; in fact, the difference in...
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作者:Itaya, J; Shimomura, K
作者单位:Hokkaido University; Kobe University
摘要:The purpose of this paper is to provide a reasonable microfoundation to justify the concept of a conjectural variations equilibrium which is often used in the literature on private provision of public goods with the help of the differential game. By interpreting the steady state conjectures in a dynamic contribution game as the conjectural variations in the corresponding static game, we derive explicit forms of Nash or non-zero conjectural variations, depending on the choice of the strategy sp...
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作者:Sillamaa, MA; Veall, MR
作者单位:McMaster University; Statistics Canada
摘要:Federal tax reform in 1988 flattened the Canadian personal income tax schedule, changing the marginal tax rates for many individuals. Using methods similar to those applied by Auten and Carroll [Rev. Econ. 81(4) (1999) 681] in the study of the effects of the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act, we estimate the responsiveness of income to changes in taxes to be substantially smaller in Canada. However we find evidence of a much higher response in self-employment income, in the labor income of seniors and ...
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作者:Croxson, B; Propper, C; Perkins, A
作者单位:University of Bristol; University of Bristol; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要:The 1991 reforms to the UK NHS created a group of buyers of hospital care from amongst primary care physicians. The implementation of the reforms was such that these buyers had incentives to increase their use of hospital services prior to entering the scheme in order to inflate their budgets. It has been argued that non-financial motives would limit such behaviour. The paper shows that these health care providers did respond to the financial incentives offered by the scheme, increasing hospit...
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作者:Pirttilä, J; Tuomala, M
作者单位:Tampere University; Bank of Finland
摘要:Using the self-selection approach to tax analysis within an OLG framework, the paper examines optimal non-linear labour and capital income taxation and the provision of a durable public good. Under endogenous wages, the marginal tax rules depend on the influence of the tax instruments on self-selection and on the income earning abilities of the households. In particular, we found that production inefficiency occurs in the model, justifying capital income taxation. For the public good, the pape...