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作者：Diermeier, D; Merlo, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Models of government formation processes in multi-party democracies are usually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs (i.e. the parties selected to propose a potential government). The theoretical literature has focused on two selection rules: selection proportional to seat share, and selection in order of seat share. In this paper, we use a new data set on government formations in 11 parliamentary democracies to empirically assess which selection rule most clos...
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作者：Cahuc, P; Malherbet, F
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Institut Universitaire de France; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：The systematic use of experience rating is an original feature of the U.S. unemployment benefits system. At first glance, experience rating does not appear to be a desirable choice for a lot of European labor markets, which are characterized by high firing costs. We provide a simple matching model of a rigid labor market that includes firing costs, temporary jobs and a minimum wage in order to analyze this issue. Our analysis leads us to argue that experience rating is likely to reduce unemplo...
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作者：Faguet, JP
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper examines whether decentralization increases the responsiveness of public investment to local needs using a unique database from Bolivia. Empirical tests show that investment patterns in human capital and social services changed significantly after decentralization. These changes are strongly and positively related to objective indicators of need. Nationally, these changes were driven by the smallest, poorest municipalities investing devolved funds in their highest-priority projects....
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作者：Keen, M; Mintz, J
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; University of Toronto; University of Toronto
摘要：One of the key features of a value-added tax-and often one of the most contentious-is the threshold level of turnover at which firms are obliged to register for the tax. Despite its importance, however, the question of the appropriate level at which to set this threshold has received little analytical attention. This paper first develops a simple rule characterizing the optimal threshold (when firms' sizes are fixed) in terms of a trade-off between tax revenues and collection costs. It then co...
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作者：Cai, HB; Treisman, D
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Competition among local governments in a decentralized political system is often thought to discipline lazy or corrupt officials, improving public good provision and increasing welfare. Some scholars note possible distortions due to spillovers or a 'race-to-the-bottom', but suggest that central transfers or regulations can remedy these. Both arguments take for granted a framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect taxes, allocate transfers, and enforce regulati...
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作者：Bilodeau, M; Gravel, N
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Indianapolis; Universite Paul-Valery; Universite de Montpellier
摘要：We examine, both in general games in strategic form and in games of voluntary provision of a public good, some implications of the assumption that individuals may obey ethical codes of conduct. The notion of morality considered captures the intuition (often attributed to Kant) that a moral action leads to the best outcome when it is properly universalized. We propose a formalization of this idea which generalizes earlier attempts made in this direction in the literature by allowing the players...
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作者：Kalaitzidakis, P; Kalyvitis, S
作者单位：University of Crete; Athens University of Economics & Business
摘要：An infrastructure-led growth model is constructed where the durability of public capital is endogenous and varies according to its usage and the level of maintenance expenditure. Policy changes in total expenditures and the maintenance share are shown to be important for the steady state and the dynamic behavior of the economy. The optimal (growth-maximizing) taxation burden which goes to both 'new' investment and maintenance expenditure is, in contrast to standard results from other growth mo...
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作者：Redoano, M; Scharf, KA
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Warwick; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Warwick
摘要：This paper analyzes policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and intedurisdictional policy spillovers under two alternative political procedures, direct referendum and representative democracy. We show that policy centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policyrnakers rather than by referendum. In these situations, centralized policies converge to the preferred ...
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作者：West, SE
作者单位：Macalester College
摘要：Previous work shows that policies that subsidize new vehicles and tax size, miles, or gasoline efficiently reduce pollution. Less is known about their distributional effects. This paper examines distributional effects by estimating the joint demand for vehicles and miles, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Greater price responsiveness among low-income households enhances progressivity of gas or miles taxes across lower incomes, and mitigates regressivity, across upper incomes. Taxes on eng...
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作者：Caselli, F; Morelli, M
作者单位：Harvard University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We present a simple theory of the quality (competence and honesty) of elected officials. Our theory offers three main insights. Low-quality citizens have a 'comparative advantage' in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than those of high-quality citizens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty). Hence, voters may find themselves supply constrained of high-quality candidates. Second, bad politicians generate negative external...
