Voluntary provision of a public good and individual morality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bilodeau, M; Gravel, N
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Indianapolis; Universite Paul-Valery; Universite de Montpellier
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00178-0
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 645-666
• 关键词: Voluntary provision; public good; individual morality

摘要

We examine, both in general games in strategic form and in games of voluntary provision of a public good, some implications of the assumption that individuals may obey ethical codes of conduct. The notion of morality considered captures the intuition (often attributed to Kant) that a moral action leads to the best outcome when it is properly universalized. We propose a formalization of this idea which generalizes earlier attempts made in this direction in the literature by allowing the players to differ both in their strategy sets and their preferences. We show that it is easy to find examples of games in which no moral behavior of this type exists or where the only existing 'Kantian' code of conduct leads to a Pareto-inefficient outcome. We then more specifically examine the issues of existence and Pareto-efficiency of Kantian norms of behavior in games of voluntary provision of a public good. We find in this context that there is no conflict between morality and Pareto-efficiency since any Kantian norm of behavior is Parcto-efficient. We also prove the existence of a Kantian norm of individual contribution. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.