作者：Mutuswami, S; Winter, E
作者单位：University of Essex; European University Institute; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We propose two sequential mechanisms for efficient production of public goods. Our analysis differs from the existing literature in allowing for the presence of multiple public goods and in also being 'simple'. While both mechanisms ensure efficiency, the payoffs in the first mechanism are asymmetric, being sensitive to the order in which agents move. The second mechanism corrects for this through a two-stage game where the order of moves in the second stage is randomly determined. The payoffs...
作者：Haufler, A; Schjelderup, G
作者单位：University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：The paper employs a model of dynamic price competition to study how international commodity taxation affects the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other's home market. We consider both the choice of international tax principle and the harmonization of tax rates and differentiate between a setting where production costs differ between countries, and a setting where exogenous tax rate differentials are the only asymmetry. T...
