Unemployment compensation finance and labor market rigidity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cahuc, P; Malherbet, F
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Institut Universitaire de France; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00018-5
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 481-501
• 关键词: experience rating; firing costs; European labor market

摘要

The systematic use of experience rating is an original feature of the U.S. unemployment benefits system. At first glance, experience rating does not appear to be a desirable choice for a lot of European labor markets, which are characterized by high firing costs. We provide a simple matching model of a rigid labor market that includes firing costs, temporary jobs and a minimum wage in order to analyze this issue. Our analysis leads us to argue that experience rating is likely to reduce unemployment and improve the welfare of low-skilled workers in France, and more generally for low-skilled workers in a typical, rigid Continental European labor market. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.