Bad politicians

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Caselli, F; Morelli, M
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00023-9
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 759-782
• 关键词: citizen-candidates; competence; elected officials' corruption

摘要

We present a simple theory of the quality (competence and honesty) of elected officials. Our theory offers three main insights. Low-quality citizens have a 'comparative advantage' in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than those of high-quality citizens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty). Hence, voters may find themselves supply constrained of high-quality candidates. Second, bad politicians generate negative externalities for good ones, making their rewards from office increasing in the average quality of office holders. This leads to multiple equilibria in quality. Third, incumbent policyrnakers can influence the rewards of future policyrnakers, leading to path dependence in quality: bad governments sow the seeds for more bad governments. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.