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最新文章

• An experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis AI翻译
  作者：Eckel, CC; Grossman, PJ; Johnston, RM
  作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Minnesota State Colleges & Universities; Saint Cloud State University
  摘要：We report the results of laboratory experiments that examine whether third-party contributions crowd out private giving to charity. Subjects play a single dictator game with a charity as the recipient. The subject chooses his preferred charity from a list. There are four treatment combinations: two initial allocations and two frames. Initial allocations are either US$18 for the subject and US$2 for the charity, or US$15 and US$5, respectively, and the subject is then given the opportunity to a...
• Tax and subsidy incidence equivalence theories: experimental evidence from competitive markets AI翻译
  作者：Ruffle, BJ
  作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
  摘要：A basic tenet in microeconomics is tax incidence equivalence, which holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax. By contrast, policymakers and the public often mistake statutory incidence for economic incidence. Using competitive laboratory markets, I test both tax incidence equivalence and an analogous theorem for subsidies. For sufficiently large markets, the results show strong support for both theories; there is little to no evidenc...
• Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment AI翻译
  作者：Cinyabuguma, M; Page, T; Putterman, L
  作者单位：Brown University
  摘要：In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a no-expulsion baseline. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is a device that helps some groups to provide public goods. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
• An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods AI翻译
  作者：Gailmard, S; Palfrey, TR
  作者单位：Princeton University; Northwestern University
  摘要：This paper compares three collective choice procedures for the provision of excludable public goods under incomplete information. One, serial cost sharing (SCS), is budget balanced, individually rational, anonymous and strategy proof. The other two are hybrid procedures: voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates (PCs) and with no rebates (NR). PCs satisfies all these properties except strategy proofness, and NR satisfies all the properties except for strategy proofness and budget balanc...
• Testing competing models of loss aversion: an adversarial collaboration AI翻译
  作者：Bateman, I; Kahneman, D; Munro, A; Starmer, C; Sugden, R
  作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of Nottingham; Princeton University; University of East Anglia
  摘要：This paper reports an 'adversarial collaboration'-a project carried out by two individuals or research groups who, having proposed conflicting hypotheses, seek to resolve their dispute. It describes an experiment which investigates whether, when individuals consider giving up money in exchange for goods, they construe money outlays as losses or as foregone gains. This issue bears on the explanation of the widely observed disparity between willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA...
• Credible assignments can improve efficiency in laboratory public goods games AI翻译
  作者：Seely, B; Van Huyck, J; Battalio, R
  作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
  摘要：This paper reports an experiment investigating how assignments improve economic efficiency in a modified version of the standard voluntary-contributions mechanism. The experiment uses a nonbinding message that makes common information assignments in the repeated game. A credible assignment is one actually followed by the participants. It turns out to be difficult to credibly assign the symmetric efficient outcome in four person cohorts, but we did discover one assignment that was credible in t...
• VCM or PPM? A comparison of the performance of two voluntary public goods mechanisms AI翻译
  作者：Rondeau, D; Poe, GL; Schulze, WD
  作者单位：Cornell University; University of Victoria
  摘要：Little progress has been made toward understanding the relative performance of the two mechanisms most widely used for fundraising: the Voluntary Contribution (VCM) and Provision Point (PPM) mechanisms. This paper provides direct comparisons of the relative performance of variants of the VCM and PPM as they are most commonly implemented in the field. The research makes use of 1296 individual observations from 721 subjects, including 40 observations from a field experiment. A meta-analysis of t...
• Experimental approaches to public economics: guest editors' introduction AI翻译
  作者：Andreoni, J; List, JA
• After you - endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games AI翻译
  作者：Potters, J; Sefton, M; Vesterlund, L
  作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Nottingham; Tilburg University
  摘要：We examine contributions to a public good when some donors do not know the true value of the good. If donors in such an environment determine the sequence of moves, two contribution orders may arise as equilibria. Either the uninformed and informed donors contribute simultaneously or the informed contribute prior to the uninformed. Sequential moves result in a larger provision of the public good, because the follower mimics the action of the leader, and in accounting for this response the lead...
• Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining AI翻译
  作者：Fréchette, G; Kagel, JH; Morelli, M
  作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; New York University
  摘要：The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is deter...