Tax and subsidy incidence equivalence theories: experimental evidence from competitive markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ruffle, BJ
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.04.009
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1519-1542
• 关键词: tax incidence equivalence; subsidy; competitive markets; Experimental economics; framing effects

摘要

A basic tenet in microeconomics is tax incidence equivalence, which holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax. By contrast, policymakers and the public often mistake statutory incidence for economic incidence. Using competitive laboratory markets, I test both tax incidence equivalence and an analogous theorem for subsidies. For sufficiently large markets, the results show strong support for both theories; there is little to no evidence, even in the short run, of the popular misperception that statutory incidence equals economic incidence. In smaller markets in which competitive forces are weaker and relative bargaining strengths may play a role, the evidence for tax incidence equivalence is weaker as minor price discrepancies may persist between markets. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.