Bank secrecy, illicit money and offshore financial centers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Picard, Pierre M.; Pieretti, Patrice
• 署名单位: University of Luxembourg; Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.004
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 942-955
• 关键词: Money laundering; Offshore banking; Compliance

摘要

This paper discusses the effects of pressure policies on offshore financial centers as well as their ability to enforce the compliance of those centers with anti-money laundering regulations. Offshore banks can be encouraged to comply with rigorous monitoring of an investor's identity and the origin of his/her funds when pressure creates a sufficiently high risk of reputational harm to the investor. We show that such pressure policies harm both offshore and onshore investors and can benefit both the bank industry and tax administrations. We show that social optimal pressure policies are dichotomous decisions between no pressure at all and a pressure great enough to persuade offshore banks to comply. The delegation of pressure policies to onshore tax institutions may be inefficient. Deeper financial integration fosters compliance by the offshore center. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.