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作者：Fabra, Natalia; von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik; Harbord, David
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Oslo
摘要：Motivated by the new auction format in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duratio...
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作者：Chakraborty, Archishman; Gupta, Nandini; Harbaugh, Rick
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Should a seller with private information sell the best or worst goods first? Considering the sequential auction of two stochastically equivalent goods, we find that the seller has an incentive to impress buyers by selling the better good first because the seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in the values of the goods across periods. When this impression effect is strong enough, selling the better good first is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium. By credibly reveal...
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作者：Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Straume, Odd Rune; Sorgard, Lars
作者单位：University of Bergen; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We analyze how the presence of trade unions affects the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. We find that wages for the merger participants are always lower when they merge internationally, rather than nationally. Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we find that the firms will merge internationally in equilibrium. There are more international mergers than socially preferred, unless products are close substitutes. A national champion p...
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作者：Ottaviani, Marco; Sorensen, Peter Norman
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Copenhagen
摘要：We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truth telling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our...
