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作者：Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination: if downstream cost differences exist, then discrimination shifts production inefficiently, toward high-cost retailers, so a ban increases welfare; if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist, discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases, so a ban reduces welfare. Using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by German retailer...
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作者：Annen, Kurt
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：In many situations, irreconcilable disagreements between players lead to costly ownership disputes over assets-for example, in case of joint ownership. This article studies the role of such disputes in a situation where two players have to make a transaction-specific investment and when contracts are incomplete. I show that potentially contested ownership may mitigate the inefficiency of investments due to the incompleteness of contracts generating an exchange surplus that comes closer to the ...
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作者：Schwartz, Warren F.; Wickelgren, Abraham L.
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We introduce discovery into a model of settlement and negative expected value (NEV) suits under asymmetric information. The option to conduct discovery has several important effects. First, because discovery is cheaper than litigation, it reduces the defendant's incentive to settle under asymmetric information. Second, discovery must be credible. Because discovery is more valuable the greater the uncertainty it resolves, this introduces a credibility constraint on pre-discovery settlement offe...
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作者：Chu, Leon Yang; Sappington, David E. M.
作者单位：University of Southern California; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We characterize the optimal contract between a principal and a risk-neutral, wealth-constrained agent when an adverse selection problem follows a moral hazard problem. The optimal contract in this setting often is more steeply sloped for the largest output levels than is the optimal contract in either the standard moral hazard setting or the standard adverse selection setting. The large incremental rewards for exceptional performance motivate the agent to deliver substantial effort both before...
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作者：Chakravarty, Surajeet; MacLeod, W. Bentley
作者单位：University of Exeter; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events (corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance). As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used by the courts. This article shows that American standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an efficient mechanism for implementing building projects given existing legal rules. It is shown th...
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作者：Hazlett, Thomas W.; Munoz, Roberto E.
作者单位：George Mason University; Universidad Tecnica Federico Santa Maria
摘要：Economic analysis of spectrum policy focuses on government revenues derived via competitive bidding for licenses. Auctions generating high bids are identified as successful and those with lower receipts as fiascoes. Yet spectrum policies that create rents impose social costs. Most obviously, rules favoring monopoly predictably increase license values but reduce welfare. This article attempts to shift analytical focus to efficiency in output markets. In performance metrics derived by comparing ...
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作者：Streb, Jochen
作者单位：University Hohenheim
摘要：This article examines the determinants of contractual form and renegotiations in the German construction industry during the Third Reich. At the beginning of World War II, firms dealt with growing uncertainty by convincing procurement agencies either to use cost-plus contracts or to include an additional risk premium in fixed-price contracts. In the later years of the war, procurement agencies initiated renegotiations over contract clauses to reduce the extraordinary profits resulting from inf...
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作者：Innes, Robert; Hamilton, Stephen F.
作者单位：University of Arizona; California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
摘要：This article considers vertical restraints in a setting in which duopoly retailers each sell more than one manufactured good. Vertical restraints by a dominant manufacturer enable the firm to acquire horizontal control over a competitively supplied retail good. The equilibrium contracts produce symptoms that are consistent with a variety of observed retail practices, including slotting fees paid to retailers by competitive suppliers, loss leadership, and predatory accommodation with below-cost...
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作者：Sweeting, Andrew
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Commercial radio stations and advertisers may have conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This article estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that stations' incentives are at least partially aligned with th...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Cambridge
摘要：The growth of the Internet and assorted technologies has made it possible to collect and process detailed information on social networks. This article investigates how firms (and governments) can harness the power of social networks to promote their goals. We show that the optimal use of social networks leads to higher sales and greater profits. However, an increase in the level and dispersion of social interaction can increase or decrease the optimal influence strategy and profits of the play...
