An empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00054.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 20-46
• 关键词: discrete-choice models; manufacturers; oligopoly; retailer; output

摘要

Economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination: if downstream cost differences exist, then discrimination shifts production inefficiently, toward high-cost retailers, so a ban increases welfare; if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist, discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases, so a ban reduces welfare. Using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by German retailers, I estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences. Simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market, and less if downstream cost differences shrink, or with less competition.