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作者：Evans, Lewis; Guthrie, Graeme
作者单位：Victoria University Wellington
摘要：This article shows how scale economies affect regulated firms investment behavior and welfare-maximizing regulation of price and quantity. Regulated firms invest in smaller, more frequent, increments than social planners, with greater investment distortions the greater the economies of scale. Regulators cap prices at lower levels than planners when economies of scale are moderate, and at higher levels when they are substantial. When quantity is also regulated, the average cost of building capa...
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作者：Lewis, Tracy R.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of delegated search. We show that the principals ability to delegate depends on the agents luck, her initial resources, and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard, the optimal contract is characterized by performance deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance cannot be specified, the optimal search ...
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作者：Piccolo, Salvatore; Miklos-Thal, Jeanine
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Rochester
摘要：This article investigates downstream firms ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above-cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about whole...
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作者：Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementationas under public--private partnershipscan bring in terms of project design an...
