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作者：Petrin, Amil; Levinsohn, James
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
摘要：We define aggregate productivity growth (APG) as the change in aggregate final demand minus the change in the aggregate expenditures on labor and capital. We show how to aggregate plant-level data to this quantity and how to decompose APG into technical efficiency and reallocation components. This requires us to confront the non-neoclassical features that impact plant-level data, including plant-level heterogeneity, the entry and exit of goods, adjustment costs, fixed and sunk costs, and marke...
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作者：Parrotta, Pierpaolo; Pozzoli, Dario
作者单位：Aarhus University; University of Lausanne
摘要：This article focuses on the phenomenon of interfirm labor mobility as a potential channel for knowledge transfer. Using data from the Danish employer-employee register covering the period 19952005, we investigate how knowledge carrierstechnicians and highly educated workers recruited from a donor firmcontribute to knowledge diffusion and enhanced productivity in the hiring (recipient) firm. Structural estimation of the hiring firms' production functions shows that the impact of the recruitment...
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作者：Carvell, Daniel; Currie, Janet; MacLeod, W. Bentley
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：Most U.S. states have enacted JSL reform, the move from a regime of joint and several liability (JSL) that allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from any one of multiple defendants to one where defendants are held liable only for the harm they cause. Contrary to previous theoretical work, we show that JSL reform can increase precaution by judgment proof agent by giving deep pockets an incentive to reduce their own liability by bringing judgment-proof agents into court. This result can help ...
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作者：Saini, Viplav
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Oberlin College
摘要：We show how to numerically solve for a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity-constrained firms. We find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes. Otherwise, firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric, which softens competition and increases procurement costs. We also find that forward-looking bidding dampens the competition-softening effects ...
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作者：Poblete, Joaquin; Spulber, Daniel
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Northwestern University
摘要：The analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability. We introduce a critical ratio that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state. The form of the contract is debt (a capped bonus) when the critical ratio is increasing (decreasing) in the state. An increasing critical ratio in the state-space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced-form d...
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作者：Filson, Darren
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College
摘要：I introduce a computable dynamic equilibrium model of the pharmaceutical industry, parameterize it using industry facts, and use it to predict what happens if the United States adopts price controls or one or more non-U.S. countries abandon their controls. The model generates implications for firm value, research and development (R&D), the flow of new drugs, and consumer welfare. I highlight the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about R&D costs, market size, technological o...
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作者：Rojas, Christian
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Motivated by the Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) models, we construct lab experiments to test the effects of two factors on collusion: information (regarding next period's demand state) and monitoring (of a rival's past action). Results indicate that information may facilitate collusion more than monitoring, especially as subjects gain experience. A robust finding is that subjects in the Rotemberg and Saloner treatment cooperate as predicted by this theory: collusion f...
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作者：Farias, Vivek; Saure, Denis; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Columbia University
摘要：In this article, we introduce a new method to approximate Markov perfect equilibrium in large-scale Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic oligopoly models that are not amenable to exact solution due to the curse of dimensionality. The method is based on an algorithm that iterates an approximate best response operator using an approximate dynamic programming approach. The method, based on mathematical programming, approximates the value function with a linear combination of basis functions. We...
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作者：Evans, Lewis; Guthrie, Graeme
作者单位：Victoria University Wellington
摘要：This article shows how scale economies affect regulated firms investment behavior and welfare-maximizing regulation of price and quantity. Regulated firms invest in smaller, more frequent, increments than social planners, with greater investment distortions the greater the economies of scale. Regulators cap prices at lower levels than planners when economies of scale are moderate, and at higher levels when they are substantial. When quantity is also regulated, the average cost of building capa...
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作者：Farrell, Joseph; Simcoe, Timothy
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Consensus standardization often involves bargaining without side payments or substantive compromise, creating a war of attrition that selects through delay. We investigate the trade-off between screening and delay when this process selects for socially valuable but privately observed quality. Immediate random choice may outperform the war of attrition, or vice versa. Allowing an uninformed neutral player to break deadlocks can improve on both mechanisms. Policies that reduce players vested int...
