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作者：Lewis, Tracy R.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of delegated search. We show that the principals ability to delegate depends on the agents luck, her initial resources, and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard, the optimal contract is characterized by performance deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance cannot be specified, the optimal search ...
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作者：Wright, Julian
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：I formalize the popular argument that retailers pay too much and cardholders too little to make use of payment card platforms, resulting in excessive use of cards. To do this, I analyze a standard two-sided market model of a payment card platform. With minimal additional restrictions, the model implies that the privately set fee structure is unambiguously biased against retailers in favor of cardholders, a result that continues to hold even if the platform can perfectly price discriminate on b...
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作者：Piccolo, Salvatore; Miklos-Thal, Jeanine
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Rochester
摘要：This article investigates downstream firms ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above-cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about whole...
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作者：Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementationas under public--private partnershipscan bring in terms of project design an...
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作者：Toth, Aron
作者单位：University of Bath
摘要：Industry dynamics are studied as an endogenous tournament with infinite horizon and stochastic entry. In each period, firms investments determine their probability of surviving into the next period. This generates a survival contest, which fuels market structure dynamics, while the evolution of market structure constantly redefines the contest. More concentrated markets endogenously generate less profit, rivals that are more difficult to outlive, and more entry. The unique steady-state distrib...
