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作者：Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L.; Petrikaite, Vaiva
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Groningen; Tinbergen Institute; University of Navarra
摘要：We study the incentives to merge and the aggregate implications of mergers in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated products and consumers search sequentially for satisfactory deals. When search frictions are substantial, firms have an incentive to merge and to retail their products within a single store, which induces consumers to begin their search there. Such a merger lowers the profits of the outsiders and may benefit consumers due to more efficient search. Overall w...
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作者：Lee, Jinhyung; McCullough, Jeffrey S.; Town, Robert J.
作者单位：Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Health information technology (IT) has been championed as a tool that can transform health care delivery. We estimate the parameters of a value-added hospital production function correcting for endogenous input choices to assess the private returns hospitals earn from health IT. Despite high marginal products, the total benefits from expanded IT adoption are modest. Over the span of our data, health IT inputs increased by more than 210% and contributed about 6% to the increase in value-added. ...
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作者：Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J. Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua
作者单位：Peking University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or two-stage auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two-stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are taken, deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show tha...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Sourav; Mukherjee, Arijit
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Michigan State University
摘要：We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identified by two parameters: (i) quality or his likelihood of observing the state (i.e., learning what the best decision is) and (ii) agenda or the preferred decision that is independent of the state. An informed expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We offer a general characterization of the equilibrium. From the decision-maker's standpoint, (a) higher quality is not necessarily better, (b)...
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作者：Dunne, Timothy; Klimek, Shawn D.; Roberts, Mark J.; Xu, Daniel Yi
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Duke University
摘要：This article estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit for two US service industries: dentists and chiropractors. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are important determinants of long-run firm values, firm turnover, and market structure. In the dentist industry entry costs were subsidized in geographic markets designated as Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) and the estimated m...
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作者：Fukuda, Emiko; Kamijo, Yoshio; Takeuchi, Ai; Masui, Michiharu; Funaki, Yukihiko
作者单位：National Defense Academy - Japan; Kochi University Technology; Ritsumeikan University; Waseda University
摘要：Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values. In the theoretical investigation, by applying the locally envy-free Nash equilibrium to the VCG, we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the a...
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作者：Montez, Joao
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：This article offers a new explanation for unscheduled price cuts and slow adoption of durable goods. We study a standard durable-good monopoly model with a finite number of buyers and show that this game can have multiple subgame perfect equilibria in addition to the Pacman outcomeincluding the Coase conjecture. Of particular interest is a class of equilibria where the seller first charges a high price and only lowers that price once somebut not allhigh-valuation buyers purchase. This price st...
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作者：Pozzi, Andrea
摘要：I examine the introduction of an online shopping service by a large supermarket chain also operating a network of brick-and-mortar stores. The establishment of the Internet channel led to a 13 percent increase in overall revenues, with limited cannibalization of traditional sales. I study the mechanisms underlying this result, focusing on two areas. First, I demonstrate the importance of the reduction of customers' travel costs in the attraction of new business. Second, I provide some evidence...
