Vertical integration, foreclosure, and productive efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reisinger, Markus; Tarantino, Emanuele
• 署名单位: WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12093
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 461-479
• 关键词: market-power; price-discrimination; exclusivity; mergers; nondiscrimination; opportunism; welfare; COSTS

摘要

We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two-part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output-shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below-cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous and differentiated products. Moreover, we show that integration with an inefficient retailer emerges in a model with uncertainty over retailers' costs, and this merger can be procompetitive in expectation.