Learning about common and private values in oligopoly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernhardt, Dan; Taub, Bart
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick; University of Glasgow
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12077
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 66-85
• 关键词: imperfect competition; price dispersion; long-run; INFORMATION; duopoly; experimentation; equilibria; bertrand; cournot; MODEL

摘要

We characterize a duopoly buffeted by demand and cost shocks. Firms learn about shocks from common observation, private observation, and noisy price signals. Firms internalize how outputs affect a rival's signal, and hence output. We distinguish how the nature of information public versus privateand of what firms learn aboutcommon versus private valuesaffect equilibrium outcomes. Firm outputs weigh private information about private values by more than common values. Thus, prices contain more information about private-value shocks.