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作者：Yang, Chenyu
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This article studies how vertical integration and upstream R&D subsidy affect innovation and welfare in vertically separated industries. I formulate a dynamic structural model of a dominant upstream firm and oligopolistic downstream firms that invest in complementary innovations. I estimate the model using data on the System-on-Chip (SoC) and smartphone industries. The results suggest that a vertical merger can increase innovation and welfare, mainly driven by the investment coordination of th...
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作者：Hernandez, Cristian; Quint, Daniel; Turansick, Christopher
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Georgetown University
摘要：We propose a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in English auctions, using variation in the number of bidders across auctions, and extend the framework to settings where the number of bidders is not cleanly observed in each auction. We illustrate our method on data from eBay Motors auctions. We find that unobserved heterogeneity is important, accounting for two thirds of price variation after controlling for observa...
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作者：Kong, Yunmi
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：In a government auction program where first-price auctions generate significantly higher revenue than English auctions, I document evidence that bidders are uncertain about the number of auction entrants. Motivated by additional data evidence, I estimate a structural model of auctions in which rivals' participation is stochastic, allowing for bidders' risk aversion and asymmetry. Counterfactual simulations reveal that bidders' uncertainty about the number of entrants, combined with risk aversi...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Konrad, Kai A.; Malueg, David A.
作者单位：Tulane University; Max Planck Society; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We consider a preemption game between competing groups; firms lobbying individually for their groups' interests provide an empirical example. Among symmetric groups, the first firm to take action bears an (unobserved) cost and wins the prize on behalf of its group. In equilibrium, the firm with the lowest cost takes action, but with delay. More competition and a smaller ratio of costs to benefits reduce delay. Firms in larger groups wait longer, but group action can occur earlier, as the proba...
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作者：Asker, John; Fershtman, Chaim; Jeon, Jihye; Pakes, Ariel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tel Aviv University; Boston University; Harvard University
摘要：This article develops a computational framework to analyze dynamic auctions and uses it to investigate the impact of information sharing among bidders. We show that allowing for the dynamics implicit in many auction environments enables the emergence of equilibrium states that can only be reached when firms are responding to dynamic incentives. The impact of information sharing depends on the extent of dynamics and provides support for the claim that information sharing, even of strategically ...
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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Li, Fei; Murry, Charles; Zhou, Yiyi
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Boston College; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We present empirical evidence supporting that used cars sold by dealers have higher quality: (i) dealer transaction prices are higher than unmediated market prices, and this dealer premium increases in the age of the car as a ratio and is hump-shaped in dollar value, and (ii) used cars purchased from dealers are less likely to be resold. In a model, we show that these empirical facts can be rationalized either when dealers alleviate information asymmetry, or when dealers facilitate assortative...
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作者：D'Annunzio, Anna; Mardan, Mohammed; Russo, Antonio
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Loughborough University
摘要：We study commodity taxation in markets where firms, such as Internet Service Providers, energy suppliers, and payment card platforms, adopt multi-part tariffs. We show that ad valorem taxes can correct underprovision and hence increase welfare, provided the government applies differentiated tax rates to the usage and access parts of the tariff. We obtain this result in different settings, including vertically interlinked markets, markets where firms adopt menus of tariffs to screen consumers, ...
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作者：Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolo, Vincenzo; Zanchetti, Piercarlo
作者单位：European University Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Bologna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Leicester
摘要：This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticompetitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future, or in adj...
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作者：Campbell, Arthur; Leister, C. Matthew; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Monash University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We develop a word-of-mouth search model where information flows from the old to the new generation for an experience good with unknown quality. We study the features of the social network that determine product quality and welfare and characterize the demand-side (under provision of search effort) and supply-side (inefficient entry by firms) factors that result in inefficiencies. One striking result is to show that the more connected but also the less-unequal a friendship network is (in the se...
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作者：Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo, V; Resende, Joana
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; McGill University; Universidade do Porto
摘要：We show that a monopolist's profit is higher if he refrains from collecting coarse information on his customers, sticking to constant uniform pricing rather than recognizing customers' segments through their purchase history. In the Markov perfect equilibrium with coarse information collection, after each commitment period, a new introductory price is offered to attract new customers, creating a new market segment for price discrimination. Eventually, the whole market is covered. Shortening th...
