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作者：Jeon, Jihye
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This article investigates the role of demand uncertainty in explaining cyclical investment fluctuations in the container shipping industry. I develop and estimate a dynamic oligopoly model with learning in which firms choose investment and scrapping. In this model, firms are uncertain about the true parameters in the underlying process for demand, and form and revise their beliefs using available information. Counterfactual analysis reveals that uncertainty about the demand process amplifies i...
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作者：Fershtman, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University
摘要：We study platform markets in which agents arrive gradually, experience changes to their preferences over time, and are frequently re-matched. We introduce simple auctions specifically designed for such markets. Upon joining, agents select a status that determines the weight assigned to their future bids. Each match is then assigned a score that depends on the agents' reciprocal bids and status. The matches maximizing the sum of the bilateral scores are implemented. Under certain conditions, su...
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作者：Haefner, Samuel; Taylor, Curtis R.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We study contracting for advice by an agent about how much a principal should invest in a project. Providing the agent with incentives to perform research endogenously generates incentives for her to misreport the results. For high-cost (low-cost) projects, she wishes to overstate (understate) the magnitude-though not the direction-of her research findings. For high-cost projects, the principal mitigates the concomitant agency rents by committing to ignore extreme (Young-Turk) recommendations,...
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作者：Bjorkegren, Daniel
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This article analyzes the potential for competition policy to affect welfare and investment in a network industry. When a network is split between competitors, each internalizes less network effects, but may still invest to steal customers. I structurally estimate consumers' utility from adopting and using mobile phones, with transaction data from nearly the entire Rwandan network. I simulate the equilibrium choices of consumers and network operators. Adding a competitor earlier could have red...
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作者：Li, Sophia; Mazur, Joe; Park, Yongjoon; Roberts, James; Sweeting, Andrew; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Renmin University of China
摘要：We estimate a model of route-level competition between airlines who choose whether to offer nonstop or connecting service before setting prices. Airlines have full information about all quality, marginal cost, and fixed cost unobservables throughout the game, so that service choices will be selected on these residuals. We conduct merger simulations that allow for repositioning and account for the selection implied by the model and the data. Accounting for selection materially affects the predi...
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作者：Chen, Zhijun; Choe, Chongwoo; Cong, Jiajia; Matsushima, Noriaki
作者单位：Monash University; Fudan University; University of Osaka
摘要：This article studies tech mergers that involve a large volume of consumer data. The merger links the markets for data collection and data application through a consumption synergy. The merger-specific efficiency gains exist in the market for data application due to the consumption synergy and data-enabled personalization. Prices fall in the market for data collection but generally rise in the market for data application as the efficiency gains are extracted away through personalized pricing. W...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Coelho, Danilo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing parties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Those we suggest are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. T...
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作者：Chen, Bo; Chen, Bo; Knyazev, Dmitriy
作者单位：Shenzhen MSU-BIT University; Hubei University of Economics; University of Vienna
摘要：We study information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner-takes-all prize (Taylor, 1995). Different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for contest sponsors. We analyze and compare various information disclosure policies in the contest with finite or infinite horizons. With an endo...
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作者：Fanning, Jack; Kloosterman, Andrew
作者单位：Brown University; University of Virginia
摘要：We conduct a novel experimental test of the Coase conjecture based on subjects' privately known preferences for fairness. In an infinite horizon bargaining game, a proposer proposes a division of chips, until a responder accepts. When players are patient, the Coase conjecture predicts almost immediate agreement on equal monetary payoffs given any possibility a responder will not accept anything less. Behavior closely matches theory. In particular, when chips are worth more to proposers than re...
