Competition in network industries: Evidence from the Rwandan mobile phone network

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bjorkegren, Daniel
• 署名单位: Brown University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12405
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 200-225
• 关键词: dynamics; adoption; MARKET; externalities

摘要

This article analyzes the potential for competition policy to affect welfare and investment in a network industry. When a network is split between competitors, each internalizes less network effects, but may still invest to steal customers. I structurally estimate consumers' utility from adopting and using mobile phones, with transaction data from nearly the entire Rwandan network. I simulate the equilibrium choices of consumers and network operators. Adding a competitor earlier could have reduced prices and increased incentives to invest in rural towers, increasing welfare by the equivalent of 1% of GDP. However, forcing free interconnection can lower incentives to invest.