3期

最新文章

• Mechanism design and communication networks AI翻译
  作者：Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
  作者单位：University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
  摘要：This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially implementable. We show that any incentive compatible social choice function is implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private valu...
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments AI翻译
  作者：Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent
  作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
  摘要：We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to Nash-implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations, show that these conditions are inconsistent with the contraction p...
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values AI翻译
  作者：Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Troeger, Thomas
  作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Mannheim
  摘要：We provide a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by a privately informed principal in generalized-private-value environments. In a broad class of these environments, the mechanism-selection game has a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium that has a strong neologism-proofness property. Equilibrium allocations that satisfy this property are characterized in terms of the players' incentive and participation constraints, and can be computed using standard methods.
• Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods AI翻译
  作者：Reffgen, Alexander; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
  作者单位：Lund University
  摘要：In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A1 x Am of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A.
• Optimal insurance with adverse selection AI翻译
  作者：Chade, Hector; Schlee, Edward
  作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
  摘要：We solve the principalagent problem of a monopolist insurer selling to an agent whose riskiness (loss chance) is private information, a problem introduced in Stiglitz's (1977) seminal paper. For an arbitrary type distribution, we prove several properties of optimal menus, such as efficiency at the top and downward distortions elsewhere. We show that these results extend beyond the insurance problem we emphasize. We also prove that the principal always prefers an agent facing a larger loss and ...
• The ex ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty AI翻译
  作者：Nascimento, Leandro
  作者单位：New York University
  摘要：This paper presents an analysis of the problem of aggregating preference orderings under subjective uncertainty. Individual preferences, or opinions, agree on the ranking of risky prospects, but are quite general because we do not specify the perception of ambiguity or the attitude toward it. A convexity axiom for the ex ante preference characterizes a (collective) decision rule that can be interpreted as a compromise between the utilitarian and the Rawlsian criteria. The former is characteriz...