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作者：Ravikumar, B.; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study the optimal auditing of a taxpayer's income in a dynamic principalagent model of hidden income. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income and stochastically transit to high income that is an absorbing state. A low-income taxpayer who transits to high income can underreport his true income and evade his taxes. With a constant absolute risk-aversion utility function and a costly and imperfect auditing technology, we show that the optimal auditing mechanism in our model consists o...
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作者：Buzard, Kristy; Watson, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a nondurable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. Trade actions are modeled as individual and trade-action-based option contracts (nonforcing contracts) are explored. The paper introduces the distinction between divided and unified investment and trade actions, and it shows the key role this distinction plays in determining whether efficient investment and trade can be achieved. Under a nonforcing dual-option...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Columbia University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence monotonicity, and show that this is a necessary condition for implementation...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR). Here we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call extensive form best response sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely directed rationalizability (Battigalli and S...
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作者：Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature's choice. Over time, they can learn the state in two ways. After each round, each player observes his own realized payoff (which may be stochastic, conditional on the state) and he observes a noisy public signal of the state (whose informativeness may ...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are modified by smooth idiosyncratic shocks, and that the monitoring is sufficiently connected. In all repeated game equilibria, each period play is an equilibrium of the stage game. When the monitoring is approximately connected and equilibrium str...
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作者：Dillenberger, David; Sadowski, Philipp
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Duke University
摘要：We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is observed by the recipient, whereas the choice of the set itself is not. Behaving selfishly under observation, in the sense of not choosing the normatively best allocation, inflicts shame on the DM. We deriv...
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作者：Balasko, Yves
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：It is shown that two arbitrary equilibria in the general equilibrium model without sign restrictions on endowments can be joined by a continuous equilibrium path that contains at most two critical equilibria. This property is strengthened by showing that regular equilibria having an index equal to 1, a necessary condition for stability, can be joined by a path containing no critical equilibrium. These properties follow from the real-algebraic nature of the set of critical equilibria in any fib...
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作者：Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially implementable. We show that any incentive compatible social choice function is implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private valu...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University; Yale University
摘要：This paper examines circumstances under which subjectivity enhances the effectiveness of inductive reasoning. We consider agents facing a data-generating process who are characterized by inference rules that may be purely objective (or data-based) or may incorporate subjective considerations. Agents who invoke no subjective considerations are doomed to ineffective learning. The analysis places no computational or memory limitations on the agents: the role for subjectivity emerges in the presen...
