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作者：Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to Nash-implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations, show that these conditions are inconsistent with the contraction p...
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作者：Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Troeger, Thomas
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Mannheim
摘要：We provide a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by a privately informed principal in generalized-private-value environments. In a broad class of these environments, the mechanism-selection game has a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium that has a strong neologism-proofness property. Equilibrium allocations that satisfy this property are characterized in terms of the players' incentive and participation constraints, and can be computed using standard methods.
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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Hao, Li; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Hong Kong; University of British Columbia
摘要：Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the end, or a deadlock, in which concessions end permanently. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case, but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between the negotiating ...
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作者：Reffgen, Alexander; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
作者单位：Lund University
摘要：In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A1 x Am of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A.
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作者：Chade, Hector; Schlee, Edward
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We solve the principalagent problem of a monopolist insurer selling to an agent whose riskiness (loss chance) is private information, a problem introduced in Stiglitz's (1977) seminal paper. For an arbitrary type distribution, we prove several properties of optimal menus, such as efficiency at the top and downward distortions elsewhere. We show that these results extend beyond the insurance problem we emphasize. We also prove that the principal always prefers an agent facing a larger loss and ...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that dominates some other options in the choice set. This paper argues that both effects may result from an individual's attempt to overcome the difficulty of making a choice in the absence of a single criter...
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作者：Nascimento, Leandro
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper presents an analysis of the problem of aggregating preference orderings under subjective uncertainty. Individual preferences, or opinions, agree on the ranking of risky prospects, but are quite general because we do not specify the perception of ambiguity or the attitude toward it. A convexity axiom for the ex ante preference characterizes a (collective) decision rule that can be interpreted as a compromise between the utilitarian and the Rawlsian criteria. The former is characteriz...
