Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; McLean, Richard P.
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1178
• 发表日期: 2014-09-01
• 页码: 555-582
• 关键词: Discontinuous game; potential game; trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; stable set; essential equilibrium; C72

摘要

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.