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作者：Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I study the problem of a durable goods monopolist who lacks commitment power and whose marginal cost of production varies stochastically over time. I show that a monopolist with stochastic costs usually serves the different types of consumers at different times and charges them different prices. When the distribution of consumer valuations is discrete, the monopolist exercises market power and there is inefficient delay. When there is a continuum of types, the monopolist cannot extract rents a...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We generalize the standard revealed preference exercise in economics, and prove a sufficient condition under which the revealed preference formulation of an economic theory has universal implications and when these implications can be recursively enumerated. We apply our theorem to two theories of group behavior: the theory of group preference and the theory of Nash equilibrium.
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作者：Cuhadaroglu, Tugce
作者单位：University of St Andrews
摘要：Interaction, the act of mutual influence, is an essential part of daily life and economic decisions. This paper presents an individual decision procedure for interacting individuals. According to our model, individuals seek influence from each other for those issues that they cannot solve on their own. Following a choice-theoretic approach, we provide simple properties that aid us to detect interacting individuals. Revealed preference analysis not only grants underlying preferences, but also t...
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作者：He, Wei; Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Wuhan University; Wuhan University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper offers a resolution to an extensively studied question in theoretical economics: which measure spaces are suitable for modeling many economic agents? We propose the condition of nowhere equivalence to characterize those measure spaces that can be effectively used to model the space of many agents. In particular, this condition is shown to be more general than various approaches that have been proposed to handle the shortcoming of the Lebesgue unit interval as an agent space. We illu...
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作者：Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Edinburgh; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Toronto
摘要：In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that, by using an asking price, sellers both maximize their revenue and implement the efficient...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto frontier of) the sequential equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in two-player repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bounding set is the sequential equilibrium payoff set with perfect monitoring and a mediator. We show that this bounding set admits a simple recursive characterization, which nonetheless necessarily involves the use of private strategies. Under our co...
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作者：Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political negotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly exogenous and partly driven by the parties' actions. There is an election scheduled at a future date and the party with more popularity at the election date wins the vote. Electoral incentives can have substa...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Glasgow; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black 1948, Dummett and Farquharson 1961) and the division of a nondisposable commodity by the uniform rationing rule (Sprumont 1991). We construct a canonical peak-only rule that equalizes, in the leximin sen...
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作者：De Oliveira, Henrique; Denti, Tommaso; Mihm, Maximilian; Ozbek, Kemal
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of St Andrews
摘要：We show how information acquisition costs can be identified using observable choice data. Identifying information costs from behavior is especially relevant when these costs depend on factors-such as time, effort, and cognitive resources-that are difficult to observe directly, as in models of rational inattention. Using willingness-to-pay data for opportunity sets-which require more or less information to make choices-we establish a set of canonical properties that are necessary and sufficient...
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo; Ju, Biung-Ghi
作者单位：Korea University
摘要：Group identification refers to the problem of classifying individuals into groups (e.g., racial or ethnic classification). We consider a multinary group identification model where memberships to three or more groups are simultaneously determined based on individual opinions on who belong to what groups. Our main axiom requires that membership to each group, say the group of J's, should depend only on the opinions on who is a J and who is not (that is, independently of the opinions on who is a ...
