One-dimensional mechanism design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moulin, Herve
• 署名单位: University of Glasgow; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2307
• 发表日期: 2017-05-01
• 页码: 587-619
• 关键词: Single-peaked preferences; strategyproof mechanisms; leximin ordering; voting; rationing

摘要

We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black 1948, Dummett and Farquharson 1961) and the division of a nondisposable commodity by the uniform rationing rule (Sprumont 1991). We construct a canonical peak-only rule that equalizes, in the leximin sense, individual gains from an arbitrary benchmark allocation: it is efficient, group-strategyproof, fair, and (for most problems) continuous. These properties leave room for many other rules, except for symmetric nondisposable division problems.