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作者：Cooke, Kevin
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I provide axiomatic foundations for a model of taste uncertainty with endogenous learning through consumption. In this setting, uncertainty is over an unobservable, subjective state space. Preference over lottery-menu pairs is sufficient to identify the state space and the learning process. In this model, the agent is viewed as if he learns the utility of an object upon its consumption. This information is used to improve choice from the follow-on menu. This implies a trade-off between consump...
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作者：Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I study the problem of a durable goods monopolist who lacks commitment power and whose marginal cost of production varies stochastically over time. I show that a monopolist with stochastic costs usually serves the different types of consumers at different times and charges them different prices. When the distribution of consumer valuations is discrete, the monopolist exercises market power and there is inefficient delay. When there is a continuum of types, the monopolist cannot extract rents a...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We generalize the standard revealed preference exercise in economics, and prove a sufficient condition under which the revealed preference formulation of an economic theory has universal implications and when these implications can be recursively enumerated. We apply our theorem to two theories of group behavior: the theory of group preference and the theory of Nash equilibrium.
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作者：Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed; Sultanum, Bruno
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Simon Fraser University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：The work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is commonly understood as a theory of bank runs driven by self-fulfilling prophecies. Their contribution may alternatively be interpreted as a theory for preventing these bank runs. Absent aggregate risk over liquidity demand, they show that a simple scheme that suspends withdrawls when a target level of bank reserves is reached implements the efficient allocation as the unique equilibrium. Uniqueness implies that there cannot be a bank-run equilibrium. Un...
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作者：Cuhadaroglu, Tugce
作者单位：University of St Andrews
摘要：Interaction, the act of mutual influence, is an essential part of daily life and economic decisions. This paper presents an individual decision procedure for interacting individuals. According to our model, individuals seek influence from each other for those issues that they cannot solve on their own. Following a choice-theoretic approach, we provide simple properties that aid us to detect interacting individuals. Revealed preference analysis not only grants underlying preferences, but also t...
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作者：He, Wei; Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Wuhan University; Wuhan University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper offers a resolution to an extensively studied question in theoretical economics: which measure spaces are suitable for modeling many economic agents? We propose the condition of nowhere equivalence to characterize those measure spaces that can be effectively used to model the space of many agents. In particular, this condition is shown to be more general than various approaches that have been proposed to handle the shortcoming of the Lebesgue unit interval as an agent space. We illu...
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作者：Momi, Takeshi
作者单位：Doshisha University
摘要：In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.
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作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Vohra, Rajiv
作者单位：University of Warwick; Ashoka University; Brown University
摘要：In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and was recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional moves in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually s...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Romanyuk, Gleb; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study learning and information acquisition by a Bayesian agent whose prior belief is misspecified in the sense that it assigns probability 0 to the true state of the world. At each instant, the agent takes an action and observes the corresponding payoff, which is the sum of a fixed but unknown function of the action and an additive error term. We provide a complete characterization of asymptotic actions and beliefs when the agent's subjective state space is a doubleton. A simple example wit...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：Stanford University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient in that the trade outcome in the mechanism converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium as the numbers of the buyers and sellers become large. Ou...
