Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ortner, Juan
• 署名单位: Boston University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1886
• 发表日期: 2017-05-01
• 页码: 817-861
• 关键词: Durable goods; Coase conjecture; stochastic costs; dynamic games

摘要

I study the problem of a durable goods monopolist who lacks commitment power and whose marginal cost of production varies stochastically over time. I show that a monopolist with stochastic costs usually serves the different types of consumers at different times and charges them different prices. When the distribution of consumer valuations is discrete, the monopolist exercises market power and there is inefficient delay. When there is a continuum of types, the monopolist cannot extract rents and the market outcome is efficient.